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While economic growth in Pakistan has averaged 3 percent 
over the past decade, Vision 2025 envisages it to be over 8 
percent between 2018 and 2025. This is a very ambitious 
target from the perspective of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), 
where annual GDP growth has tended to remain lower than 
the national average. As part of its Economic Growth Strategy, 
the Government of KP aims to increase investments in min-
erals and oil and gas development; value adding industries; 
and tourism, with supporting infrastructural investments in 
energy and power, water, transport, labor, and science and 
technology. 
The implications of demographic changes, however, are not 
directly acknowledged in the strategy, even though the gov-
ernment does aspire to “achieve a stabilized population by 
2020 through the expeditious completion of demographic 
transition that entails decline both in fertility and mortality 
rates” in its Comprehensive Development Strategy 2010-
2017 (CDS).
The effect of population changes on KP’s economic growth 
can potentially be very significant. The province is currently 
undergoing a demographic transition from a situation of high 
fertility and high mortality to one of lower fertility and mortali-
ty (Figure 1). The resulting bulge in its working-age population 
means the province is poised to reap a “demographic divi-
dend”—the boost in income per capita and its growth that ac-
crues when the share of working age individuals in a popula-
tion rises relative to dependents, resulting in a higher support 
ratio,1 as well as increased labor supply and savings. As the 
Asian Tigers have demonstrated, a robust working-age popu-
lation can serve as a potent, real world pathway for achieving 
economic growth. However, harnessing the powerful thrust of 
the demographic dividend requires the timely execution of a 
well-conceived plan of action involving major interventions in 
the education, health (including reproductive health/popula-
tion welfare), and labor sectors.
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Future economic growth is likely to be closely linked, 
if not driven, by how rapidly fertility declines further.
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FIGURE 1:  EMERGING BULGE IN KP’S WORKING-AGE POPULATION
Source: Population Census 1972 Source: Population Council Projections 2015
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Encouragingly, the Economic Growth Strategy of the 
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa shows a focus 
on enhancing the productive potential of the current 
and future work force through focused investments 
in labor as well as more efficient and targeted inter-
ventions in education, population welfare and other 
social sectors. However, while the need to reduce 
population growth is recognized intuitively, there is 
relatively low awareness that the speed at which 
fertility declines now in KP will have a huge impact 
on the magnitude of the economic boost it is able to 
reap from the demographic dividend. 
A recent study of prospects for economic growth in 
Pakistan under alternative demographic scenarios 
quantified the massive differences in growth that 
can be achieved with slow, moderate and rapid fer-
tility decline in KP.2 This brief presents the study’s 
key findings to facilitate a deeper understanding of 
the connection between the speed of fertility de-
cline and the size of the demographic dividend, and 
the scale of the economic gains at stake.
FERTILITY DECLINE AND 
PROSPECTS OF A DEMOGRAPHIC 
DIVIDEND IN KP
As fertility declines in KP, the rate of growth in the lowest tiers 
of its population pyramid (ages 0-14) is slowing down. How-
ever, due to the momentum of past high fertility and current 
improvements in infant and child survival, there will not be an 
appreciable change in the rate of growth of the working-age 
population for perhaps two decades. In proportion to depen-
dents, the working-age share of the total population is rising.
To assess the effect of this rising support ratio on future 
economic growth, Bloom, Chen and Sathar (2015) employed 
state-of-the-art theoretical and statistical models designed 
to capture the complexity of economic growth processes and 
their interactions with demographic trends specific to the Pa-
kistani context. The model is outlined in Box 1 (back page). 
Projections of the total population were generated for three 
fertility decline scenarios—moderate decline in the total fer-
tility rate (TFR) from the current level of 3.9 to replacement 
fertility (TFR 2.1) in 2050;3 slow decline in TFR, which would 
mean that replacement fertility is reached sometime after 
2050; and rapid decline in TFR, implying that replacement 
fertility is attained before 2050. For population projections, 
the base year was 1998, when the last census was conduct-
ed, while 2011 was taken as the base year for the per capita 
income and demographic dividend comparison. The results 
for KP are summarized in Table 1. 
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the speed of fertility 
decline, the population of KP could grow to 48 million or to 
42 million by 2050. Compared to a scenario of rapid fertility 
decline, slow fertility decline implies approximately 4 million 
more young dependents in the population. This will translate 
into a lower support ratio—1.64, as against 1.97 with rapid 
fertility decline (Table 1). 
A higher support ratio represents an increase in the productive 
capacity of the economy on a per capita basis, which creates 
the prospect of a spurt in economic growth—the demographic 
dividend. To maximize the size of the demographic dividend, 
the support ratio must be maintained at optimal levels while 
the “boom” in the working-age population lasts. Fertility must 
decline as much as possible to raise the support ratio, and as 
fast as possible to allow the high support ratio to prevail over 
a longer period. Figure 3 presents the historical and prospec-
tive trend in KP’s support ratio and how it is affected by the 
pace of fertility decline. Notably, the support ratio started to 
rise in the late 1990s—when energetic efforts were made to 
increase uptake of family planning—but it is now beginning to 
plateau. It can be expected to rise significantly if a moderate 
or rapid pace of fertility decline is achieved.
“The need for lowering the growth rate of 
population is more urgent than ever.” 
VISION 2025
Scenario 1
Slow Fertility 
Decline
Scenario 2
Moderate 
Fertility Decline
Scenario 3
Rapid Fertility 
Decline
Assume TFR
Remains 0.5 
births higher 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Declines steadi-
ly to 2.1 births 
per woman by 
2050
Remains 0.5 
births lower 
than the mod-
erate decline 
assumption
Total 
Population
47.7 million 44.9 million 42.2 million
Support ratio 1.64 1.79 1.97
Per capita GDP 
Growth
316% 360% 412%
Demographic 
Dividend
149% 194% 245%
TABLE 1:  PROJECTED DEMOGRAPHICS AND ECONOMIC GROW TH 
IN KP IN 2050 WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID 
FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
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Differences in the support ratio, in turn, lead to wide diver-
gences in the per capita GDP growth attainable (Figure 4). 
In 2050, per capita income in KP is expected to be slightly 
above $2,200 if fertility persists at current levels; a little over 
$3,500, if fertility declines slowly; and over $4,300, if fertility 
drops rapidly.
This means that if the fertility rate continues to hover in the 
current vicinity of 3.9, KP’s GDP per capita will only be about 
167 percent greater in 2050 than it is today; however, if the 
TFR declines rapidly, KP’s GDP per capita could grow by as 
much as 412 percent. In other words, a precipitous decline 
in fertility could boost income in KP by 245 percent over cur-
rent levels, independent of any additional income growth that 
occurs over this horizon. By comparison, a slow decline in 
fertility would lead to a 149 percent boost in income, which, 
significant as it is, represents only about three fifths of the 
dividend achievable. 
The results show that, overall, for every one unit of decrease 
in the total fertility rate, GDP per capita is expected to in-
crease by 90-100 percent. Further fertility decline is going to 
be associated with a rise in per capita income, but the level of 
benefits to be accrued will multiply if there is a serious effort 
at interventions that speed up the decline while the support 
ratio is elevated. This is a strong economic argument for in-
vesting in a more rapid fertility decline in the province.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
By 2050, KP’s per capita income will be 167 percent higher 
than today’s levels if there is no decline in fertility, but 412 
percent higher if fertility declines rapidly. The scale and ef-
fectiveness of efforts to reduce fertility levels in KP will deter-
mine whether per capita income in the province grows by 316 
percent or by 412 percent by 2050. The possible demograph-
ic dividend of a 245 percent increase in per capita income is 
simply too huge to be ignored in economic growth strategy, 
especially given KP’s resource constraints and development 
aspirations. The findings presented in this brief show clearly 
that, if KP is to harness the demographic dividend, planners 
must invest at least as heavily and urgently in efforts to raise 
the contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) as in interventions to 
educate, train and productively employ the youth bulge.
	  
	  
	  
FIGURE 2:  PROJECTED POPULATION GROW TH IN 
KP WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID 
FERTILIT Y DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 3:  HISTORICAL TRENDS AND PROJECTED 
GROW TH IN KP’S SUPPORT RATIO WITH 
SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID FERTILIT Y 
DECLINE
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
Source: Bloom, Chen, and Sathar 2015
FIGURE 4:  PROJECTED PER CAPITAL GDP GROW TH IN 
KP WITH SLOW, MODERATE,  AND RAPID 
FERTILIT Y DECLINE
“Our Vision today is to make Pakistan 
the next Asian Tiger.”
VISION 2025
Time is of the essence. The demographic dividend is a limit-
ed-time offer, and once fertility reaches replacement levels, 
the demographic transition model predicts some semblance 
of equilibrium between fertility and mortality levels. By around 
2050, the bulge that is currently in the working-age tiers will 
have progressed through to older tiers of the pyramid, while 
a reduced population of young people will have entered KP’s 
work force. Accordingly, the support ratio will decline and the 
dividend window will close
KP must act fast to lower its TFR and maintain a high sup-
port ratio through what is left of the dividend period. The pro-
cess can be kick-started by focusing on eliminating unmet 
need for family planning, which is estimated at 26 percent, 
and represents an opportunity for a rapid demand-driven in-
crease in KP’s CPR from the current level of 28 percent to 
54 percent. This alone will reduce the TFR from 3.9 to the 
wanted level of fertility of 2.6 (PDHS 2013). In comparison, 
the KP government’s FP2020 goal of raising the CPR to 42 
percent by 2020 will reduce the TFR to 3.2. While increased 
investment in family planning will be entailed in eliminating 
unmet need, and further efforts will be needed to ensure a 
continuation of the rapid fertility decline trajectory, the costs 
are more than justified by the substantially large economic 
boost achievable.
ENDNOTES
(1) The support ratio expresses the proportion of working-age individuals relative 
to dependents in the population. It is defined here as the working age population 
(15-59) divided by the non-working age population (<15 or>59 years). (2) D. E. 
Bloom, S. Chen and Z. Sathar, “Prospects for economic growth in Pakistan under 
alternative demographic scenarios” (Population Council, Islamabad). (3) The TFR 
measures the average number of children expected to be borne by every woman 
in a population during her lifetime. The model’s TFR assumptions for the three 
fertility decline scenarios are indicated in Table 1.
GDP growth estimations in the model follow the convergence model proposed by Barro (2004). The final multiple regression growth 
equation is derived by manipulating the Solow growth model and states the determinants of the growth of income per capita.
Where yt = log(   ) (Y is aggregate income), w = log(   ) (L is labor force) and Xt denotes time-variant control variables other than demo-
graphic variables. 
The model assumes Sindh’s total fertility rate, which currently stands at about 3.9 children per woman, will decline to the long-run 
replacement level of 2.1 children per woman. The model also assumes that life expectancy in Sindh will increase to 69 years by 2050.
To test the sensitivity to fertility rates, three fertility decline scenarios are considered:
1. Moderate fertility decline (Medium Variant), which assumes that the TFR declines at a steady pace and reaches replacement 
level (2.1 births per women) by 2050.
2. Rapid fertility decline (Low Variant), which assumes that TFR is 0.5 births lower than under the medium fertility (1.6 births per 
woman) assumption throughout.
3. Slow fertility decline (High Variant), which assumes that the TFR is 0.5 births higher than under the medium fertility (2.6 births 
per woman) assumption throughout. 
An indicator “IDD” is introduced, which measures the relative size of demographic dividend and is defined as
IDDi  =                     .     
Where yi2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 under scenario i, y
0
2050 is the GDP per capita in 2050 in base case scenario and y2011 is the 
GDP in the staring year.
Source: Derived from Bloom, Chen, and Sathar (2015). 
BOX 1:  MODEL USED TO PROJECT PROSPECTS FOR 
ECONOMIC GROW TH UNDER ALTERNATIVE 
DEMOGRAPHIC SCENARIOS
yt = −αyt + βwt + αwt + δlt + η
T Xt + €tα
Yt
Pt
Yt
Lt
yi2050 – y
0
2050
y2011
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“The speed at which fertility declines now 
in KP will determine the magnitude of the 
economic boost it will experience.”
